I Introduction
When the Soviet Union launched its first satellite in 1957, the Americans, who had always assumed their technological superiority, were deeply shocked. They responded with a crash programme of training in science and engineering. Had the rate of increase in training between 1957 and 1962 been sustained until 1992, there would have been two scientists for every man, woman and dog in America. So, we have to be careful not to extrapolate wildly on the basis of events that are temporally bounded.
Much of the discussion on globalisation is in danger of ignoring this caveat. It is guilty of both suggesting that we are witnessing a unique phenomenon of global integration, and in believing that this trajectory is unstoppable. But history tells us something different. In many respects the process of global integration we have witnessed in the last two decades of the twentieth century merely restores the levels of the late nineteenth century (Baldwin and Martin 1999) . In the intervening decades, the process of inter-country integration led to the development of political processes which forced a move towards greater inward focus.
In the same way, the current phase of global integration is setting in train tensions which may well slow, stop and even reverse these recent trends. The obvious case is the rise in opposition to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in the industrially advanced countries, but similar events can be found in other parts of the world (for example, the opposition of Indian farmers to intellectual property rights). The focus in this article is on whether globalïsation is associated with rising economic insecurity; if it is, is there a causal link between the two, and might this insecurity threaten its sustainability?
As social actors (since we are not only academic observers) we need to concern ourselves with policies that might lead to the most positive outcome for the most people, and especially for the most vulnerable people. So it is important to restate the obvious: globalisation, which is essentially the global extension of the division of labour that Adam Smith addressed, allows for specialisation and has the potential to enhance the quality of lives of a great many people. In fact, it has done so manifestly over the past two decades, which is one of the reasons why it has deepened so rapidly and pervasively The policy challenge, therefore, is to fashion these global processes in such a way that the gains (including with respect to increasing security) are spread more widely and, given the concerns of this Bulletin, that this occurs in a framework of greater rather than lesser economic security1 The key issue here is to recognise that global processes are constructed and are within our control -they are neither inevitable nor beyond remedial action. Although countries were deeply integrated during this earlier period of history, the 'reach' of global processes in terms of the absolute and relative numbers of those affected by global processes is now almost certainly much wider. Argentina and Australia may have been major exporters of commodities and importers of finance in the nineteenth century, but in the current period these flows have considerably more pervasive effects on their populations.
Related to this, the recent period has seen a much more marked globalisation of ideas, world views and ideology than in the nineteenth century (where the global flows were of people, finance and goods). This affects not just the spread of global advertising and aspirations to remote areas around the globe, but also expectations about consumption powers and human rights.
In the late nineteenth century, trade flows tended to be in final products, whereas we are now witnessing greater levels of 'functional' integration whereby producers in different locations are involved in increasingly 14 differentiated sub-processes in the production chain. (This difference has led some observers to contrast nineteenth century 'internationalisation' with twentieth century 'globalisation'). A contemporary traded final product, such as a computer or a camera, typically involves globally decomposed production processes involving producers in many countries. Thus, the coordination of global production networks is increasingly complex and provides particular challenges and powers to key firms acting on a global stage.
A second feature of contemporary global processes is that they are both complex and heterogeneous.
Globalisation has many dimensions and often these will work in contradictory ways. Take, for example, the case of labour. In the current period we are simultaneously witnessing significant reductions in the barriers to the mobility of skilled people, and increases in the barriers to the mobility of the unskilled. Their outcomes are also increasingly complex. For example, as we shall see, it is not just that inter-country income distribution has widened, but that it has become much more complex in nature.
And third, by definition, the economic dimensions of globalisation represent a widening of the sphere of specialisation and the division of labour, in this case between economic actors in different countries. At the same time, globalisation reflects a significant speeding-up of the social division of labour. Irs other words, structural change is both pervasive and rapid, and since all structural change involves adjustment (people moving out of activities with declining returns and those entering activities with expanding horizons), it is inevitable that tensions will rise. Change -especially change which affects livelihoods -is always stressful. 3.1 Perceptions of insecurity may be more important than the incidence of insecurity
In considering economic insecurity, one central concern lies with the nature and quality of perceptions. A story from the Second World War is illustrative here. An attempt was made to gauge the morale of two groups of US military personnel; one was a group of academics specialising in Japan studies who were drafted into the military earned military incomes and wore military uniforms but were allowed to continue with their professional life as before; the second group comprised a set of infantry soldiers in the Pacific. The surprising outcome was that the morale of the former group was lower than that of the infantry soldiers. The reason for this was to be found in the expectations and reference group of each of the two samples. The Japan specialists compared themselves to their colleagues who were on regular incomes and did not have to wear uniforms; the infantry soldiers compared themselves to their friends and colleagues who had been killed or wounded.
Hence, the first critical point to note about insecurity is that it is inherently subjective. It may not be so much a matter of the absolute levels of insecurity, but the perception of insecurity which drives political actors in their response to global processes.
How does this translate into the modern world of globalisation and economic insecurity? Consider first the case of the high income countries. Robert Reich, the former US Secretary for Labour and a distinguished academic, observing the large and growing incidence of poverty in the USA, characterised these victims as being an 'underclass'.
On top of all underciasses -by definition -is an 15 'overclass'. But between these two groups, argued Reich, was a new and growing category the 'anxious class', the middle class and professionals formerly in secure employment but now feeling vulnerable to the winds of change allowed into the USA by global integration (Reich 1991) . A similar story can be told about the UK where it is widely believed that employment security has declined at a societal level. This is despite the fact that, according to the UK Treasury, studies of employment tenure show virtually no change: people continue to move jobs at the same frequency as in previous periods, across all skill levels.
Hence, at some level, perhaps the most important element of economic insecurity in the modern world is the growing gap between expectations and reality It may or may not be true that economic insecurity has grown or fallen. Some UK evidence, as we have seen, suggests that in some respects there has been no change; in other cases, and in other measures, it is unquestionable that economic insecurity has grown. But the key factor affecting the response to globalisation is that it is widely believed that globalisation is associated with significantly heightened levels of insecurity This view not only probably reflects reality but is one that has been widely spread through the globalisation of ideas and opinions. It is not uncommon, therefore, to find middle classes in developing countries who in reality have a large measure of security but who believe that they too are victims of heightened economic insecurity The point here is not to deny that globalisation has led to greater economic insecurity -in many cases, this is unambiguously the case. At issue is whether people believe themselves to be more or less insecure, since this is what affects their responses to global processes. We have no systematic evidence on these perceptions -but casual empiricism suggests that this perception is increasingly widespread, fuelling a growing body of protests against the WTO and other institutional manifestations of globalisation.
Economic security is undermined by volatility and uncertainty2
One of the consequences of openness has been that economic activity is increasingly reliant on external economic events. In recent decades, this external The volatility of both capital flows and GDP growth was much greater in developing countries than in the industrial countries ( Table 2 ).
The costs of this volatility were greater for Source: International Monetary Fund (1999) (Table   3 ). More developing countries experienced currency crises than industrial countries, and with a greater negative impact on output.
Thus, although currency mobility was a characteristic of both nineteenth century internationalisation and twentieth century globalisation, the latter period was characterised by significantly greater volatility A primary driver of this instability was the development of new technologies which allowed for instantaneous (and often also automated) trading. Allied to this, the march of a gobai policy-agenda has ied to the abolition of capital controls and other banking regulations at the behest of globalising institutions (such as the IMF and the World Bank), and this has made recipient countries more open to the volatile flows of finance. Currently, more than the equivalent of $1 ,500bn is exchanged every day in global currency markets, yet less than 10 per cent of this is required to fuel international trade. 1996) Calculated by summing the differences between trend growth and output growth after the crisis began until the time when annual output growth returned to its trend and by averaging over all crises, Per cent of mises in which output was lower than trend after the crisis began Calculated by summing the differences between trend growth and output growth after the cmiii began until the time when annual output growth returned so its trend and by averaging over all crises that had output losses.
Source. 1Mb (1998) speculative flows, arid here currency traders are characterised by herding behaviour. This means that the swings which follow changes of 'market sentiment' (often irrationally based) are very substantial indeed, leading to a succession of currency crises. This is a form of instability which has a major impact on currency rates, economic activity and employment, and hence is a prime driver of insecurity in the current age. Although the Asian Crisis of 1997 also reflected economic fundamentals, the rapid swings of currency out of the region sharpened the economic cycle, and led to very significant falls in output in many of the region economies.
3.3 Economic insecurity is reflected in both absolute and relative standards of living An important component of economic insecurity is its impact on poverty, for in its most basic sense, 'security' offers the prospect of sustained survival. The problem here is that 'poverty' is a fuzzy concept -it is simultaneously a measure of absolute standards and one of relative standards of wellbeing. Here the evidence suggests that recent decades of globalisation have seen an increase in both of these meanings of poverty, and in this sense we can conclude that at least for many of the world population, economic insecurity has increased.
What is this evidence?
Despite high rates of growth in many regions of the world, there has been little dent in the number of But it is not just absolute levels of poverty that have increased. So, too, has relative poverty A striking phenomenon of the post-war period has been the development of the so-called 'twin-peaks' distributional pattern. This can be seen from Figure   1 (not that the horizontal axis is on a log-scale), which suggests a significant change, with the development of a more unequal and complex pattern. A cluster of economies has emerged at the bottom end of the scale (with per capita incomes of less than 10 per cent of the US level) and a process of catch-up at the top end of the scale.
Another measure of inter-country income distribution is provided by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Human Development
Report. This suggests a striking increase in intercountry inequality over the past 180 years (Table   3) , particularly after the Second World War (when, as we can see from Table 5 , globalisation advanced rapidly).
These widely quoted inter-country distributional figures must, however, be treated with a 'health- warning' since they are calculated at official exchange rates rather than by taking account of the actual purchasing power of currencies (that is using PPP rates). Consequently there has been a debate recently on whether global income distribution has indeed become more unequal. On the one hand, it is argued that the rapid growth of China and India in recent years has led to a narrowing of inter-country income differentials, that is, to an improvement in intercountry income distribution (Wolf 2000) . This is because these two countries, which have seen a significant rise in average per capita incomes, account for a very large share of global population. Therefore, comparing income differentials between countries on the basis of population-weighted average incomes produces an equalising trend,3
But, global income inequality can also be measured in relation to individual incomes, rather than to inter-country average incomes. That is, although average per capita income in China may have risen, worsening income inequality means that very large numbers of the Chinese population have either been excluded from the gains from growth, or may even be worse off (Khan 1999 The growth of global inter-country inequality has been mirrored by the growth of inequality within countries, both in the high-and low-income worlds:
In high income economies in general, income distribution has tended to become more unequal (Streeten 1998) , particularly in the Anglo-Saxon economies (Dunford 1994 ).
In the Netherlands real wages fell between 1979 and 1997 (1-lartog 1999) .
In the USA, real wages were lower in the mid1990s than they were in the late 1960s, and family incomes only held up as a consequence of longer working hours and more working members of the family (Kaplinsky 1998 urban and rural areas, coastal and interior provinces, and within urban and rural areas (Khan 1999 ).
In Chile, often thought to be the paradigmatic gainer from globalisation, the gini-coefficient increased from 0.46 in 1971 to 0.58 in 1989 (Rodrik 1999) .
Inequality has grown markedly in the transition economies (Table 6 ).
Inequality between skilled and unskilled wage earners has tended to increase in the industrially advanced countries (Wood 1994) 
and in Latin
America over the past decade (Wood 1997) There are two ways in which these developmentsboth with regard to absolute and relative levels of poverty -square up with the issue of insecurity they have come to expect as 'normality'; the distance between social groups is also part of this 'normality', so when it increases, people feel more insecure. And it is possible, as we shall discuss below, that it is this feeling of insecurity, rather than the reality of insecurity, which determines social action.
What is the 'unit of analysis' in assessing economic insecurity?
Whose security is at issue? At the highest level of disaggregation we are concerned with individuals and head counts -how many people are affected by global processes, and in what ways. But humans are also parts of groups, including the family For example, in the USA, real wages of unskilled labour (one measure of economic security) fell for over two decades and only regained their 1973 levels in 1998; yet family incomes increased because in general the participation rate increased and people worked longer hours. In other cases, the 'family' has little meaning, since in large parts of the world (the Caribbean, parts of Africa and increasingly in rich countries such as the UK) the 'family' is not a stable unit.
Another unit of measurement is the producing institution; the firm or the farm. Here the spread of globalisation has been associated with substantial volatility, especially in poor countries, since one of the primary characteristics of import substituting industrialisation was that it was underspecialised.
Trade liberalisation has meant that even when overall output has been maintained or even wages and job protection) has declined from 45,000 to 16,000 over the past four years, so employment in the informal sector (with lesser security and lower wages) has grown by more than 16,000. In Latin America, too, trade liberalisation during the 1990s was associated with falling employment and hence economic insecurity for the formal sector labour force ( Table 7) . As a general rule, therefore, we can conclude that liberalising low income countries have experienced significant volatility in terms of the population of firms and that this has almost certainly had a disproportionate impact on labour.
Another related measure of insecurity has been its impact on sub-national regions. We have come to recognise recently that a significant element of economic activity is its spatial specificity It is not so much Brazil that exports leather shoes, but the Sinos Valley (Schmitz 1995 1970-1996 1990-1996 1970-1996 1990-1996 1970-1996 1990-1996 The realm of perception and belief is probably crucial here. One of the lessons to be drawn from history is that populations do not revolt when they are suffering from absolute levels of poverty but when their expectations are out of synch with their real experience. Both the French and Russian revolutions occurred after periods of relative prosperity followed by drought and war respectively which lowered the capacity of the system to satisfy these rising expectations.
Globalisation in the twenty-first century is no longer just the global extension of consumption patterns or factors; increasingly it also reflects the global extension of expectations. Growing perceptions of economic insecurity as much as the reality of growing economic insecurity, may well be the Achilles' heel of contemporary globalisation.
Notes
The IDS Globalisation Team focuses its work on the exploration of policies designed to better spread the gains of globalisation -see www.ids.ac.uk/globall
The discussion on volatility is informed by the work of my colleague Stephany Griffith-Jones.
However, Wolf k conclusions have been questioned as resulting from a small sample of countries, and Lundberg and Milanovic cite studies using larger samples, which estimate that inter-country income inequality has indeed increased (Lundberg and Milanovic 2000) .
